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ABSTRACT
CLAIRE E. DUNN: The Participating Poor: The Effect of Conditional Cash Transfers on
Beneficiary Political Participation
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber.)
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs entered the social policy scene in Mexico and
Brazil in the mid-1990s and have since been adopted by policymakers throughout Latin
America. While the effects of these programs on health, education, child labor and poverty
have been widely studied, the political effects have not been considered in nearly as much
depth. Yet we know from studying other social policies that they often have consequences
beyond their intended goals. In this paper I build on the existing literature on CCTs and
the political consequences of social policies to examine the effect of CCTs on broad polit-
ical participation. Using survey data from across Latin America and the Caribbean, I find
that beneficiaries of CCTs are more likely to participate in a variety of electoral and non-
electoral types of participation. Using the same survey data, I also aim to understand the
mechanisms that lead CCT beneficiaries to participate at higher rates than non-beneficiaries.
I find that beneficiaries express higher levels of political interest, stronger senses of political
efficacy and greater trust in political institutions than non-beneficiaries. I argue increased
participation among CCT beneficiaries is a result of policy feedback effects, but that these
feedback effects are the opposite of what existing literature on advanced democracies would
lead us to expect, indicating a need to adjust our theories to the Latin American context. 1
1 I thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United States
Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank, and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.
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INTRODUCTION
Conditional cash transfers(CCTs), programs that provide cash transfers to low-income
families provided that they comply with certain conditions related to the development of
human capital among their children, became a major new tool in Latin American social
policy in the mid-1990s. With few exceptions, the programs are now found throughout the
region and have been shown to have major effects on poverty-reduction, school attendance
and utilization of health services(Fiszbein, Schady and Ferreira 2009). These wide-ranging
positive effects are all the more impressive given that CCTs cost just 0.3 to 0.4 percent of
GDP on average(Paes-Sousa, Regalia and Stampini 2013).
Despite the fact the CCTs have been so widely studied and have been adopted in coun-
tries across the world, we do not know a great deal about the political effects of CCTs.
In political science, the study of CCTs has narrowly focused on whether or not the pro-
grams are insulated from clientelism and, as such, has focused almost exclusively on voting
behavior. To date our knowledge about the political effects of CCTs beyond voting re-
mains limited. Given that these programs cover so many citizens, nearly a quarter of the
region’s population in 2010 (Paes-Sousa, Regalia and Stampini 2013), understanding how
these policies impact political behavior among beneficiaries is a substantively important
question.
Literature on advanced capitalist democracies suggests that social policies can have
wider ranging effects on the political behavior of beneficiaries and likewise suggests that
the nature of these effects is related to the design of the policy. While this literature is
quite rich, limited work has considered how these findings may translate to the context of
less-developed states. This literature would lead us to assume, for instance, that CCT pro-
grams should actually serve as a disincentive for political participation among beneficiaries
because of the conditions they impose(Watson 2015; Bruch, Ferree and Soss 2010). In this
paper I argue that we need to change our expectations for Latin America. Not only are
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baseline participation levels of the poor in Latin America higher than we see in more devel-
oped countries like the United States(Booth and Seligson 2008), but the welfare state is also
much less extensive(Huber and Stephens 2012). Likewise, the conditions associated with
CCTs are often not enforced or, when enforced, are used as a means of identifying when
families may need more help rather than less(Bastagli 2009). I argue that these new and
positive interactions with the state should increase the political interest of beneficiaries as
well as their sense of political efficacy and trust in political institutions resulting in higher
levels of political participation compared to other citizens of similar socioeconomic status.
To test my argument I use the 2014 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)
AmericasBarometer survey data. The AmericasBarometer survey is a representative survey
of voting age individuals throughout Latin America and the Caribbean and is particularly
useful because it asks respondents if they benefit from a conditional cash transfer program2 .
My sample includes all countries in which a CCT program is present and in which citizens
were asked about their beneficiary status. The survey also asks respondents about their
participation in a number of political activities, their level of political interest and probes
their senses of political efficacy and trust making it well suited for me to consider not only
the level of participation among CCT beneficiaries, but also to test the mechanisms I suspect
are at work in leading to increased participation.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. First I examine what we know
about the feedback effects of social policies and discuss why these theories may need to be
adjusted to fit the Latin American context. Second, I discuss the data and methods I use to
test my theory. Third, I discuss the results of my statistical tests and finally I conclude and
provide steps for future research.
Political Participation and Social Policy
Before examining how social policies can impact political participation, it is first impor-
tant to consider what political participation looks like and who tends to participate. Democ-
2 The actual survey questions used are included in the appendix
2
racy is based on the concept of citizen participation in governing. While the precise defini-
tion of democracy is often debated, no definition excludes the role of participation by the
people. Beyond being a basic component of democracy, political participation can be seen
as key to the quality of democracy. Where a greater portion of the population actively partic-
ipates in politics, the government is responsive to a greater portion of the citizenry(Altman
and Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n 2002). We should think then of participation not just as an integral part of
democracy, but that frequent and diffuse participation is integral to high quality democracy.
Political participation is a broad concept. I follow Seligson and Booth (1976) in defining
political participation as an action taken to influence the political system at any level as
well as working collectively to solve problems not addressed by the government. Voting is
perhaps the most obvious variety of participation, however many more political activities
should also be considered.
Different types of political participation are more or less frequent depending on the level
of initiative, coordination, and information required to complete each(Verba, Nie and Kim
1987). Voting, for instance, requires minimal information, initiative, or coordination and
therefore a large portion of the population often participates in this way. Contacting a public
official, on the other hand, while still requiring low coordination, requires high information
and high initiative resulting in lower rates of participation.
I consider nine types of participation including voting, attending different types of po-
litical meetings, solving a community problem, contacting political officials and protesting.
While protest is often categorized as an unconventional form of participation and there-
fore excluded from many studies of political participation, I choose to include it because
protest is relevant in this case. The increased demand for health and education services by
beneficiaries due to CCT conditionalities, it was thought, should lead to pressures on the
government for increased supply as well as improved quality of such services. Some bene-
ficiary protests have been reported (2006 CCT beneficiary protests for better health services
in Panama, for example), though they have been few.
Political participation does not happen in a vacuum and a citizen’s propensity to par-
ticipate can be influenced through demographic factors as well as contextual factors. A
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large body of literature has argued that political participation is also effected by public poli-
cies. This literature focuses on the idea of policy feedback effects and is the foundation
of my argument for why CCT beneficiaries are more likely to participate in politics than
non-beneficiaries.
Policy feedback effects arguments build on the idea that “new policies create a new
politics”(Schattschneider 1935). Policies create both incentives and resources that influence
the actions of groups influenced by that policy (Pierson 1993). That social policies have
feedback effects is not a new concept and many studies have considered what such effects
might be. The majority of this literature has focused on the United States and Western
Europe. For example, Social Security in the United States led to a major mobilization of
senior citizens. Once among the least likely to participate, senior citizens of all education
and income levels have become among the most politically active groups following the
expansion of Social Security(Campbell 2003).
The feedback effects of social policies, however, are not always positive. Looking more
specifically at particular types of welfare programs, a number of studies have a found that
universal welfare programs increase participation, while targeted, means-tested programs
have the opposite effect(Kumlin 2004; Mettler and Stonecash 2008; Bruch, Ferree and Soss
2010; Watson 2015). Targeted programs, though, can have a positive effect if they are
not highly stigmatized (Watson 2015) or if the policy’s authority structure is democratic
instead of paternalistic(Bruch, Ferree and Soss 2010). The structure of the program is key
to understanding what effects the policy will have on beneficiaries.
Based on the trends observed in the United States and Europe we might be expect CCTs
to have a negative impact on participation due to the targeted and conditional nature of the
programs. However, the literature on developing countries casts doubt on this assumption;
CCTs can actually lead to increased participation. Scholars have identified electoral ef-
fects from CCT programs. In Brazil, Bolsa Familia has led to an electoral bonus for the
incumbent party presidential candidate, regardless of their party identification, but has not
lead to a bonus for other members of the president’s party or caused beneficiaries to change
party identification(Hunter and Power 2007; Zucco 2008, 2013). Similar patterns are found
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in Mexico(De La O 2013; Dı´az-Cayeros and Magaloni 2009). Most of this work has the
underlying goal of identifying whether or not these programs are used in a clientelistic
manner, but it has largely been acknowledged that, at least in the cases of Brazil and Mex-
ico, the electoral bonus from the CCT is due to a mobilizing mechanism compatible with
programmatic politics rather than a persuasive mechanism(De La O 2013).
I have already acknowledged, however, that political participation goes beyond voting
behavior. There is some evidence that Mexico’s CCT program has led CCT beneficiaries to
contact public officials, engage in community activism, and engage in civil society at higher
rates than non-beneficiaries(Schober 2013). If this effect exists in Mexico, we may expect
to see similar effects from CCTs in other countries.
Given the evidence found in this literature, we are then left to wonder why CCTs may
have the opposite effect than we should expect given the findings from studies of feedback
effects on targeted social policies in advanced democracies. I aim to explain the gap.
The policy feedback effects literature would suggest that the conditions associated with
CCTs are paternalistic and therefore keep beneficiaries marginalized rather than giving
them an incentive to participate more. While it is possible to argue that CCTs are paternalis-
tic due to the conditions, I argue that paternalism is in fact limited. While the programs have
behavioral requirements attached to them, this is balanced out to some extent by the fact
that these programs are based on joint responsibility of the family to bring their children to
school and regular health appointments, but also the state to provide and improve education
and health services (Rawlings 2006). Likewise, in some Latin American countries, such as
Brazil, access to public health and education services are considered constitutional rights
so the conditions can also be considered simply as a mechanism for encouraging citizens to
realize their rights to such services.
Finally, enforcement of conditions varies greatly by country. Some countries, such as
Ecuador, encourage beneficiaries to increase usage of health and educations services, but
do not actually monitor compliance. In these cases the paternalistic aspect of the programs
is certainly minimized. Other countries, like Brazil, do monitor compliance with condition-
ality and take steps to address non-compliance, but do so in a step by step manner where
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initial enforcement is a warning and continued failure to comply is met with gradually more
serious responses. Non-compliance, though, is actually viewed as a sign that the family may
need additional support rather than as a reason to punish them(Bastagli 2009). With this
type of enforcement, again, the paternalistic aspect is somewhat minimized.
In addition to programs being less paternalistic than perhaps assumed, CCTs often rep-
resent beneficiaries initial interaction with the welfare state. One of the key differences
between the Latin American context and the US or European context is the size of the wel-
fare state. The Latin American welfare state is less developed than the welfare states of the
advanced industrial world and has largely been linked to formal sector employment(Huber
and Stephens 2012). As such, those who benefit from CCT programs are generally peo-
ple who were not previously incorporated into the welfare state. Welfare programs have
the ability to either reinforce the marginal status of citizens by excluding them from such
programs or incorporating them only in paternalistic programs or, conversely, to draw them
into democratic society(Soss 2000). As I have already argued against CCTs being strongly
paternalistic, I argue that by incorporating new citizens into the welfare state, they are be-
ing drawn into democratic society and given more full citizenship rights. The realization of
such rights should give beneficiaries a greater stake in democratic politics and therefore a
greater interest in participating to influence such politics.
I argue that the key mechanisms driving higher levels of participation by CCT bene-
ficiaries are tied to this inclusion in the welfare state. Particularly, I argue that benefiting
from a CCT will lead to increased levels of political interest and sense of political efficacy
as well as higher levels of trust in institutions. Following the idea of policy feedbacks, by
gaining a clear stake in the political system, politics have become salient in the lives of
beneficiary families in a way that they were not before they were tied to the state through
a CCT. By being newly included in the welfare state and having benefits tied to the use of
state-provided services like public education and health care facilities, CCT beneficiaries
are likely to begin to see politics as quite central to their lives. Hunter and Sugiyama find
some evidence of this when asking beneficiaries what they would do if politicians were to
eliminate Bolsa Familia. Respondents replied that they would vote against any politician
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making such claims as well as protest and sign petitions should such a person get elected
and move forward with eliminating the program (Hunter and Sugiyama 2014). Such re-
sponses provide evidence that beneficiaries, at least in Brazil, have an interest in politics as
a result of their status as beneficiaries. As such, I hypothesize that beneficiaries should have
increased levels of political interest compared to non-beneficiaries controlling for levels of
education, wealth and other key factors that may impact political interest.
In addition, seeing the state responding to their needs may lead to increased feelings
of political efficacy among beneficiaries. Political efficacy refers both to the idea that
politicians are responsive to citizen demands and that citizens feel they are able to influ-
ence the political process. The way in which a policy is formulated has the potential to
convey the positive message to beneficiaries that they are deserving and the government
cares about helping them or, conversely, that they are burdensome. When beneficiaries
receive the more positive message, they may see the government as responsive to their
needs(Schneider and Ingram 1993). Similarly, beneficiaries may view the government as
responsive to their needs when the policy leads them to have positive interactions with a
government agency. For example, Hunter and Sugiyama note that beneficiaries of Bolsa
Familia are those who historically would have received social benefits through clientelistic
means. The CCT benefit on the other hand, is largely viewed by beneficiaries as free from
influence of single politician or group of politicians; rather than being viewed as contin-
gent, benefits are seen as a right(Hunter and Sugiyama 2014). The process of receiving a
benefit in a non-clientelistic manner may lead to an increased sense of political efficacy.
Likewise, evidence from a short-term CCT programs in Uruguay showed that beneficiaries
of that program reported higher levels of confidence in the government(Manacorda, Miguel
and Vigorito 2011). When political efficacy is higher, we should expect levels of political
participation to be higher as well(Seligson 1980).
Trust in government institutions is closely tied to political efficacy in the literature. Trust
has been cited as a key factor in driving political participation(Cruz-Coke 2001; Almond
and Verba 1963), but the literature is far from conclusive on the impact of trust on partic-
ipation. Many studies have considered the effect of trust on political participation and the
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findings are quite varied with some suggesting that high trust, particularly when combined
with high efficacy, leads to increased political participation(Gamson 1968) while others
have found evidence that trust does not play an important role, but rather political efficacy
is the main driver of participation(Seligson 1980). Given the lack of consensus in the liter-
ature, I choose to consider trust along with efficacy and hypothesize that beneficiaries will
express higher levels of trust in government and that this higher level of trust contributes to
greater levels of participation.
Additional explanations for why CCTs may lead to higher participation are possible,
but unconvincing. For example, one could make a socioeconomic resources case for in-
creased participation. Underlying much of the work on political participation is the initial
assumption that the poor participate less than the non-poor. This assumption is prevalent,
though debated, and underlies much of the literature that claims democracy is only possible
when a country reaches a certain income level (Lipset 1959, 1960; Boix and Stokes 2003).
The argument is that the poor lack the time or money to participate in democracy. This
assumption runs deep and is supported by evidence from wealthy democracies where the
poor do in fact tend to participate at lower rates than the non-poor(Verba and Nie 1987).
Evidence from Latin America, however, suggests that the poor and non-poor partici-
pate at relatively equal rates(Booth and Seligson 2008). We therefore would not expect
an increase in resources alone to influence participation. Even if we were to accept the
idea that socioeconomic resources are the main driver of participation, CCT beneficiaries
remain poor (Stampini and Tornarolli 2012). While CCT benefits have been shown to have
a poverty-reducing effect, they are actually quite small transfers and generally do not bring
beneficiaries out of poverty, but rather just reduce the severity of poverty. For example, the
average transfer from Brazil’s Bolsa Familia program in 2015 was R$167.15 , or just under
USD $50.00(Gazola Hellman 2015) per family. Even though their resources increase due
to the CCT, beneficiaries continue to have comparatively low resources so would not be
expected to participate at higher rates. Changes in levels of political interest, efficacy, and
trust are much more promising mechanisms.
In the following section, I test the effect of CCTs across a range of participatory behav-
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iors as well as test possible explanations for why CCT beneficiaries may participate more.
My hypotheses are as follows:
H1: CCT beneficiaries will participate in politics at a higher rate than non-beneficiaries
of similar socioeonomic status. While the magnitude of this effect may differ based on
types of participation, I expect it to hold for all types of participation.
H2: CCT beneficiaries will express higher levels of political interest than non-beneficiaries
of similar socioeconomic status.
H3: CCT beneficiaries will express a stronger sense of political efficacy and greater
trust in political institutions compared to non-beneficiaries of similar socioeconomic status.
While the existing research suggests that CCTs shape participatory behavior among
beneficiaries, this body of work is heavily focused on voting behavior and single country
case studies without considering broader trends across the region as a result of these pro-
grams. If CCTs have important impacts on democratic participation, we should see these
effects hold across the region.
Data and Methods
To test my hypotheses, I use data from the 2014 Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP) AmericasBarometer surveys. The surveys are nationally and regionally repre-
sentative samples of voting age individuals conducted throughout Latin America and the
Caribbean. For the purposes of this study, I use all of the countries in the region that
have conditional cash transfer programs and for which participants were asked about their
beneficiary status in such a program. This results in 17 countries 3 in my sample and
3 Countries included in this analysis are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad &
Tobago, and Uruguay
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approximately 25,000 observations.
First I examine whether evidence supports my theory that beneficiaries will participate
at higher rates than non-beneficiaries. I look at nine different types of participation, con-
sidering each as a separate dependent variable. These dependent variables are voting in the
last presidential election, registering to vote, attending political meetings, attending munic-
ipal meetings, attending community meetings, solving a community problem, requesting
help from a local official, requesting help from a municipal office, and protesting. As is
evident from the summary statistics in tables 1 and 2, citizens are most likely to partici-
pate by registering to vote and voting. We may be somewhat suspect of the high degree
of voting reported in part because the survey question asks citizens if they voted in the last
presidential election. In some cases the last presidential election may have been quite re-
cent while in others it may have been a number of years ago in which case we may have
reason to distrust citizen’s ability to remember. In none of the other types of participation
is participating more common than not participating.
Because the data is individual-level data clustered by country, I estimate multilevel mod-
els with varying intercepts. Because of the clustered nature of the data, a multilevel model
is needed to ensure correct standard errors. For six of the models, the dependent variable
is dichotomous (a person either participated or they did not) so I estimate multilevel logit
models. The original survey questions about attendance at political meetings, attendance
at community improvement meetings, and helping to solve a community problem, are not
simple yes or no questions, but rather consider the frequency with which a person partic-
ipates. Because the responses are ordered, I estimate multilevel ordered logit models for
these three dependent variables. The survey questions and response options are included in
the appendix.
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Table 1: Participation Summary Statistics-Dummy Variables
Participation Type Yes No
Vote 20,809 7,420
(73.71) (26.29)
Register 26,072 2,116
(92.49) (7.51)
Municipal Meeting 2,536 25,805
(8.95) (91.05)
Contact Local Official 4,575 23,699
(16.18) (83.82)
Contact Municipal Office 4,022 24,323
(14.19) (85.81)
Protest 1,911 26,308
(6.77) (93.23)
*percent in parentheses
Table 2: Participation Summary Statistics-Ordinal Variables
Participation Type Weekly Monthly Yearly Never
Comm. Prob. 1,400 3,360 4,916 18,527
(4.96) (11.91) (17.43) (65.69)
Comm. Meet 776 2,977 3,279 21,317
(2.74) (10.50) (11.57) (75.19)
Pol. Meet 425 1,185 3,127 23,604
(1.50) (4.18) (11.03) (83.29)
*percent in parentheses
In each of the models, my main independent variable is CCT beneficiary status coded
as a dummy variable with 0 for non-beneficiaries and 1 for beneficiaries. I control for other
demographic characteristics that are frequently thought to influence political participation
including sex, age, years of education, wealth4 , and a dummy variable for whether the
person lives in a urban or rural area. Additionally, age is often argued to have a curvilinear
effect on participation with the young and old participating less than those in middle age
categories. As such, I include both age and age squared to model this curvilinear effect.
4 I use wealth rather than income as other scholars using LAPOP data have done because income is self-
reported making it less reliable and also prone to high levels of missing data. Wealth is measured as an
additive index of 14 material goods and access to basic service that interviewees were asked if they owned.
These include a refrigerator, a landline telephone, a cellular phone, number of vehicles, a washing machine,
a microwave oven, a motorcycle, indoor plumbing, an indoor bathroom, a computer, internet, a television, a
flat screen television, and connection to the sewage system.
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In the developed world, the gender gap in participation has narrowed or disappeared,
however, there is some evidence that a gender gap still seems to exist in Latin Amer-
ica(Desposato and Norrander 2009). Because of the continued existence of a gender gap, I
expect the female variable to have a negative effect on participation. That education should
have a positive effect on participation is widely accepted (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam
1995), so I expect my education control variable to have a positive effect on participation.
The effect of wealth is arguable(Krishna 2008; Verba and Nie 1987) so I have no clear ex-
pectation of how wealth may impact participation. Finally, urban residents may participate
more than rural residents in certain types of political participation such as voting where
central location may facilitate participation, but may have the opposite effect on other types
of participation where the interpersonal reliance of rural communities may facilitate coordi-
nation and mobilization(Seligson and Booth 1976). Because of the varied effect depending
on type of participation, I am neutral as to the expected effect of the urban dummy.
The model for each type of participation is shown below. The only differences between
the models is that when looking at voting and voting registration, I add an additional control
for whether or not these actions are compulsory in each country.5
Participationij = γ00 + γ10(CCTij) + γ20(Femaleij) + γ30(Eduij)
+γ40(Ageij) + γ50(Age
2
ij) + γ60(Wealthij) + γ70(Urbanij) + υ0j + rij
To test my second hypothesis, I look at the effect of being a CCT beneficiary on reported
political interest. Political interest is measured on scale of zero to three with zero being no
interest and 3 being a lot of interest. I recode the variable as dichotomous, setting the two
lowest response categories (indicating little to no interest) to 0 and the 2 highest response
categories (indicating some to a lot of interest) to 1. I use the same set of controls as I use
5 Data for whether or not voting and registering to vote is compulsory comes from the Institute for Demo-
cratic and Electoral Assistance Voter Turnout Database: http://www.idea.int/themes/voter-turnout
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in the models for my first hypothesis.
PoliticalInterestij = γ00 + γ10(CCTij) + γ20(Femaleij) + γ30(Eduij)
+γ40(Ageij) + γ50(Age
2
ij) + γ60(Wealthij) + γ70(Urbanij) + υ0j + rij
Finally, I test my final hypothesis, that beneficiaries will express a greater sense of
political efficacy and greater trust in political institutions. My measure of political efficacy
takes into account how much respondents agree or disagree with the statement, “Those
who govern this country are interested in what people like you think.” Respondents answer
on a scale of one to seven with one indicating strongly disagree and 7 indicated strongly
agree. I recode responses to create a dichotomous variable with only the 2 highest response
categories being recoded 1 and the 5 lower response options recoded to 0. I use this question
as it gets at whether or not citizens view government as interested in responding to their
needs.
As a compliment to this measure, I also look at trust in government institutions. As
previously noted, political efficacy and trust in institutions are closely tied in the literature.
I specifically focus on trust in the president, the national congress, and the local or municipal
government. As with efficacy, trust is originally measured on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 indicating
no trust and 7 indicating high trust. I recode these variables to dichotomous variables as well
with responses of a six or a seven recoded 1 to indicate high levels of trust and the five lower
responses recoded zero indicating low levels of trust.
For the political efficacy and trust models I control for demographic factors as before,
but also for a number of variables that represent government performance since studies have
found that trust in institutions and feelings of political efficacy are related to evaluations of
government performance(Espinal, Hartlyn and Kelly 2006; Lee, Randall and Vaught 2015).
These variables include whether or not a person has been a victim of crime in the past year,
whether they know someone who was a target of clientelism in the last national elections
and whether respondents think their economic situation is better, the same, or worse than
a year ago. Crime and clientelism are expected to have negative effects on efficacy while
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improvements in perception of economic status are expected to have a positive effect on
efficacy(Lee, Randall and Vaught 2015).
PoliticalEfficacyij = γ00 + γ10(CCTij) + γ20(Femaleij) + γ30(Eduij)
+γ40(Ageij) + γ50(Age
2
ij) + γ60(Wealthij) + γ70(Urbanij)
+γ80(Crimeij) + γ90(Econij) + γ100(Clientelismij) + υ0j + rij
Results
My statistical analyses provide support for each of my three hypotheses; CCT beneficia-
ries seem to participate at higher rates as well as express higher levels of political interest,
political efficacy, and trust in institutions.
Political Participation
I find that CCT beneficiaries participate at higher rates than non-beneficiaries across
all nine forms of political participation considered. The models produce the following
coefficients and standard errors for the the independent variable, CCT. 6
Table 3: Model Coefficients and Standard Errors for CCT
Participation Coefficient Std. Error
Vote 0.184* 0.046
Register 0.140* 0.070
Municipal Meeting 0.417* 0.081
Political Meeting 0.575* 0.060
Community Meeting 0.429* 0.056
Community Problem 0.318* 0.051
Contact Local Official 0.386* 0.066
Contact Municipal Office 0.462* 0.050
Protest 0.315* 0.071
*p < 0.05
6 Full results for each model are available in the appendix
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The first two types of political participation I test, registering to vote and voting, are
considered among the easiest types of participation in which citizens can engage. Given that
both of these types of participation are compulsory or automatic in much of the region and
the vast majority of the population already participates in both, I did not necessarily expect
to find large differences here. I do, however, find a positive and statistically significant
relationship between being a CCT beneficiary and both voting in the presidential election
and registering to vote. The predicted probability of CCT beneficiaries having voted is .80
compared with .77 for non-beneficiaries. As noted previously, there is reason to be hesitant
about the results related to voting however, given that the survey used asks about voting in
the last presidential election which may have been a number of years ago in some cases.
Responses to this question may not be reliable.
Likewise, the predicted probability of beneficiaries registering to vote is .944 compared
to .936 for non-beneficiaries. That beneficiaries may be more likely to register to vote
makes sense given that a voter registration card is in many cases one of the identification
documents that beneficiaries can use to meet CCT program requirements. While the coef-
ficient on CCT is significant for registering to voter, the difference between the predicted
probabilities is not statistically significant indicating that the substantive difference is neg-
ligible.
Moving to less frequent types of participation overall, I continue to find that CCT ben-
eficiaries participate more than non-beneficiaries. First, I consider attendance at meetings.
I look at three different types of meetings: municipal,community, and political party or
movements. I also include in this group, helping to solve a community problem since
participation in community problem solving is approximately as frequent as meeting at-
tendance. Again, I find that CCT beneficiaries are statistically significantly more likely to
participate. Beneficiaries have a predicted probability of attending a municipal meeting of
.11 compared to .08 for non-beneficiaries. Additionally, they have a predicted probability
of attending a meeting of a political party or movement yearly of .14 compared to .09 for
non-beneficiaries. The predicted probability of attending such meetings more frequently
(monthly or weekly) is also higher for beneficiaries than non-beneficiaries. CCT beneficia-
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ries have a predicted probability of attending a community meeting yearly of .14 compared
to .11 for non-beneficiaries and a predicted probability of helping to solve a community
problem yearly of .20 compared to .18 for non-beneficiaries. Again, the pattern holds when
looking at participating in each of these activities monthly or weekly as well, while non-
beneficiaries are more likely to never participate in any of these activities. The predicted
probabilities for beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries are statistically significantly different
from one another for each of these types of participation.
The next type of participation I consider is contacting public officials or offices. I look
at contacting a local official and contacting a municipal office. CCT beneficiaries have a
.19 predicted probability of requesting help from a municipal office compared to .13 for
non-beneficiaries and a .21 predicted probability of requesting help from a local official
compared to a .14 predicted probability for non-beneficiaries. Again, predicted probabilities
for beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries are statistically significantly different from
each other.
Finally, I look at protest, a type of participation that is the least frequent. The pattern
of CCT beneficiaries participating more than non-beneficiaries, however, continues. Partic-
ipation in protest is much less common overall, though CCT beneficiaries have a predicted
probability of protesting of .08 compared to .06 for non-beneficiaries, a 33% increase in
participation. It would be useful to know what types of protests beneficiaries are joining,bt
they pro or anti government, but unfortunately this information is not available in this sur-
vey.
Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Participating-Dichotomous Variables
Participation Type Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary Diff. Statistically Significant?
Vote 0.799 0.769 Yes
Register 0.944 0.937 No
Municipal Meeting 0.113 0.078 Yes
Contact Local Official 0.205 0.144 Yes
Contact Municipal Office 0.186 0.126 Yes
Protest 0.080 0.060 Yes
While I find statistical significant difference between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
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for all types of participation, the magnitude of the difference varies. For the most part, sub-
stantive differences are small with predicted probabilities increasing by approximately .03
in most cases for beneficiaries compared to non beneficiaries. When we look at contacting
officials, however, the increase is greater with the predicted probability for beneficiaries
approximately .06 higher than for non-beneficiaries. The larger substantive effect in this
type of participation makes sense for a number of reasons. First, beneficiaries are learning
to interact with the government. Beneficiaries may start engaging with local officials as a
means of understanding their benefits, addressing potential problems with their benefits, or
expressing dissatisfaction with public services they must use as part of the conditions at-
tached to receiving benefits. Likewise, compared to other types of participation, contacting
officials can happen on the beneficiaries own schedule and is not dependent on coordination
with others or an event like a meeting, protest, or election being scheduled.
Table 5: Predicted Probabilities of Participating-Categorical Variables
Participation Type Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary Diff. Statistically Significant?
Community Problem
Weekly 0.060 0.047 Yes
Monthly 0.143 0.116 Yes
Yearly 0.198 0.176 Yes
Never 0.598 0.661 Yes
Community Meeting
Weekly 0.035 0.024 Yes
Monthly 0.133 0.096 Yes
Yearly 0.140 0.112 Yes
Never 0.692 0.769 Yes
Political Meeting
Weekly 0.021 0.012 Yes
Monthly 0.057 0.035 Yes
Yearly 0.138 0.094 Yes
Never 0.784 0.858 Yes
In each of my models, an additional finding of interest is that in five out of nine types of
participation I consider, the female variable has a statistically significant and negative effect
on participating. Only in one case, voting, does the female variable have a statistically
significant positive effect. Given that CCT benefits are often provided directly to women,
we may expect CCTs to have a stronger effect on participation among women than among
17
men. To test this possibility, I interact female and CCT. There is some evidence that CCTs
do lead to higher rates of voting among women(Baez, Camacho, Conover and Za´rate 2012)
and my analysis corroborates this finding across the region. When I include the interaction,
the effect of CCT alone goes away indicating that the effect was likely mostly due to the
increase in voting by female beneficiaries. With the exception of voting, the interaction
term does not have a statistically significant effect on political participation. I do not find an
interactive effect for any other type of participation. Additionally, for five of the nine types
of participation, the interaction terms is negative, while in four it is positive. CCTs do not
appear to have a consistently stronger mobilizing effect on women than on men.
Table 6: Model Coefficients and Standard Errors for CCT*Female
Participation Coefficient Std. Error
Vote 0.179** 0.086
Register 0.059 0.058
Municipal Meeting -0.002 -0.110
Political Meeting -0.069 0.083
Community Meeting -0.034 0.075
Community Problem -0.078 0.069
Contact Local Official 0.079 0.085
Contact Municipal Office 0.073 0.091
Protest -0.114 0.131
**p < 0.05
Political Interest
Given that there does appear to be a relationship between broad forms of political par-
ticipation and CCT beneficiary status, I also examine two explanations for why CCTs have
such an effect. First, I examine my second hypothesis-that benefiting from a CCT leads to
increased political interest among beneficiaries. Here I also find evidence supporting my
hypothesis. Being a CCT beneficiary has a positive and statistically significant effect on
political interest. Higher levels of political interest, then can help explain the link between
CCT beneficiary status and increased political participation.
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Table 7: Predicted Probabilities-Political Interest
Variable Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary Diff. Statistically Significant?
Political Interest 0.380 0.324 Yes
Political Efficacy
Finally I test my third hypothesis, that beneficiaries will have stronger sense of political
efficacy and higher levels of trust in government than non beneficiaries7 . Again, I find
support for my hypothesis. Benefiting from a CCT has a statistically significant and positive
effect on political efficacy. Beneficiaries have a higher predicted probability of agreeing that
the government listens to people like them. Similar trends hold for trust in the president ,
the national congress, and local or municipal government.
Table 8: Predicted Probabilities-Political Efficacy
Variable Beneficiary Non-Beneficiary Diff. Statistically Significant?
Gov. Listens to People Like Me 0.307 0.280 Yes
Trust President 0.306 0.244 Yes
Trust National Congress 0.155 126 Yes
Trust Local Government 0.214 0.191 Yes
As with political interest, the results suggest that political efficacy may also be at work in
linking CCT beneficiary status with higher levels of political participation. Given that CCT
beneficiaries also express higher levels of trust in institutions, my work seems to suggest
that both political efficacy and trust may be at work rather than just one or the other.
Discussion
Using survey data from 17 Latin American countries, I find support for my hypothesis
that CCT beneficiaries participate more than non-beneficiaries in nine different types of
political participation. Beneficiaries participate more in very common activities such as
7 Trinidad and Tobago drops out of these models as not all questions included in the models were asked in
that country
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voting, but also in less common activities such as contacting public officials, attending
meetings, and protesting.
Increases in political participation are consistent with the concept of policy feedback
effects. My statistical results suggest that increased political interest, feelings of political
efficacy, and trust in government institutions as a result of benefiting from these programs
may be at work in influencing beneficiaries decisions to participate more frequently.
The fact that CCT beneficiaries participate at higher rates than non-beneficiaries runs
contrary to what we would expect based on the policy feedback effects literature. The
conditional nature of CCT programs does not have a demobilizing effect and actually has
the opposite effect. These results are consistent with my argument that we need to adjust
our theories to fit the Latin American context. The history of less developed welfare states
that failed to cover much of the population in Latin America contrasts with more expansive
welfare states in Europe and the US. This contrast can help explain why we see a different
impact of a targeted, conditional program in the Latin American context than the literature
would lead us to expect. Accounting for the importance of initial inclusion into the welfare
state is necessary.
While I find evidence to support my theory, more work is needed on the broader polit-
ical effects of CCTs. Speaking to beneficiaries about their motivations for participating in
democratic politics will take us a long way in understanding the causal mechanism behind
their higher levels of participation compared to the non-beneficiary population.
Additionally, work should also consider whether CCT beneficiaries exhibit similar
trends in participation over time or if the effect diminishes or grows over time. It is con-
ceivable that once beneficiaries begin to develop a stronger interest in politics, this interest
will remain high or continue growing and, as a result, participation may remain higher
among this group. Panel data would be very helpful in examining such trends, but to my
knowledge is not yet available.
Additionally, we might ask if CCT beneficiaries are forming organizations on their own
or being mobilized by existing organizations. While individual participation is important in
its own right, collective action is necessary if groups such as CCT beneficiaries are to have
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a larger impact on policymaking.
As CCTs have expanded and become increasingly important tools in the social policy
toolboxes of developing countries, understanding their effects on political behavior beyond
simply voting merits further study.
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONS
Table 9: Survey Questions and Response Options
Question Response 1 Response 2 Response 3 Response 4
Are you registered to vote? Yes No
Did you vote in the last
presidential elections? Yes No
Have you attended a town
meeting,city council meeting or other
meeting in the past 12 months?
Yes No
Do you attend meetings of a political
party or political organization...
Once a
week
Once or
twice
a month
Once or
twice
a year
Never
Do you attend meetings of a
community improvement committee
or association...
Once a
week
Once or
twice
a month
Once
or twice
a year
Never
In the last twelve months have you
helped to solve a problem in your
community or in your neighborhood?
Once a
week
Once or
twice
a month
Once or
twice
a year
Never
Have you sought assistance from or
presented a request to any office,
official or councilperson of the
municipality within the past 12 months?
Yes No
In order to solve your problems
have you ever requested help or
cooperation from a local public official
or local government:for example
, a mayor,municipal council,
provincial official, civil governor or
governor?
Yes No
In the last 12 months have you
participated in a demonstration
or protest march?
Yes No
How much interest do you have in
politics? A lot Some Little None
Those who govern this country are
interested in what people like you think.
How much do you agree or disagree with
this statement?
Strongly Disagree (0) - Strongly Agree(6)
To what extent do you trust the President? Not at All(0) - A lot(6)
To what extent do you trust the
National Congress? Not at All(0) - A lot(6)
To what extent do you trust the local
or municipal government? Not at All(0) - A lot(6)
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APPENDIX B: MODEL OUTPUT
Table 10: Model Output:Vote
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2.
CCT 0.184* 0.088
(0.046) (0.064)
Female 0.074* 0.045
(0.032) (0.035)
CCTxFemale 0.179*
(0.086)
Age 0.226* 0.226*
(0.005) (0.005)
Age2 -0.002* -0.002*
(0.000) (0.000)
Edu 0.064* 0.064*
(0.005) (0005)
Wealth 0.011 0.011
(0.007) (0.007)
Urban -0.228* -0.228*
(0.041) (0.041)
Compulsory 0.711* 0.712*
(0.222) (0.223)
Constant -5.188* -5.173*
(0.218) (0.218)
var( cons[Country]) 0.188 0.188
(0.067) (0.067)
Observations 25,555 25,555
Number of groups 17 17
* p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 11: Model Output: Registering to Vote
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2
CCT 0.140* 0.108
(0.070) (0.098)
Female 0.017 0.005
(0.052) (0.058)
CCTxFemale 0.0592
(0.131)
Age 0.213* 0.213*
(0.008) (0.008)
Age2 -0.002* -0.002*
(0.000) (0.000)
Edu 0.083* 0.083*
(0.008) (0.008)
Wealth 0.014 0.014
(0.011) (0.010)
Urban -0.181* -0.181*
(0.065) (0.065)
Compulsory 1.035 1.036
(0.821) (0.821)
Constant -3.582* -3.576*
(0.796) (0.796)
var( cons[Country]) 1.181 1.181
(0.443) (0.443)
Observations 25,508 25,508
Number of groups 17 17
* p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 12: Model Output: Attend Political Meeting
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2
CCT 0.542* 0.575*
(0.045) (0.060)
Female -0.299* -0.283*
(0.035) (0.040)
CCTxFemale -0.069
(0.083)
Age 0.040* 0.041*
(0.006) (0.006)
Age2 -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) ((0.000))
Edu 0.032* 0.0302*
(0.005) (0.005)
Wealth -0.027* -0.027
(0.007) (0.007)
Urban -0.238* -0.238*
(0.043) (0.043)
Constant Cut 1 2.691* 2.699*
(0.216) (0.216)
Constant Cut 2 3.929* 3.937*
(0.217) (0.217)
Constant Cut 3 5.340* 5.348
(0.222) (0.222)
var( cons[Country]) 0.429 0.429
(0.152) (0.152)
Observations 25,625 25,625
Number of groups 17 17
* p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 13: Model Output: Attend Municipal Meeting
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2
CCT 0.416* 0.417*
(0.059) (0.081)
Female -0.153* -0.152
(0.045) (0.050)
CCTxFemale -0.002
(0.110)
Age 0.066* 0.066*
(0.008) (0.008)
Age2 -0.001* -0.001*
(0.000) 0.000
Edu 0.056* 0.056*
(0.007) (0.007)
Wealth -0.014 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009)
Urban -0.352* -0.352*
(0.055) (0.055)
Constant -4.204* -4.204*
(0.202) (0.202)
var( cons[Country]) 0.058 0.058
(0.024) (0.024)
Observations 25,629 25629
Number of groups 17 17
*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 14: Model Output: Attend Community Meeting
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2
CCT 0.411* 0.429*
(0.040) (0.056)
Female -0.111* -0.104*
(0.030) (0.033)
CCTxFemale -0.034
(0.075)
Age 0.075* 0.075*
(0.005) (0.005)
Age2 -0.001* -0.001*
(0.000) (0.00)
Edu 0.029* 0.029*
(0.004) (0.006)
Wealth -0.015 -0.015
(0.006) (0.006)
Urban -0.478* -0.478*
(0.036) (0.036)
Constant Cut 1 2.830* 2.834*
(0.177) (0.177)
Constant Cut 2 3.655* 3.659*
(0.178) (0.178)
Constant Cut 3 5.404* 5.407*
(0.181) 0.181
var( cons[Country]) 0.259 0.259
(0.091) (0.091)
Observations 25,637 25,637
Number of groups 17 17
*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 15: Model Output: Solve Community Problem
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2
CCT 0.278* 0.317*
(0.037) (0.051)
Female -0.274* -0.260*
(0.026) (0.029)
CCTxFemale -0.078
(0.069)
Age 0.059* 0.059*
(0.005) (0.005)
Age2 -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Edu 0.051* 0.051*
(0.004) (0.004)
Wealth 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.006)
Urban -0.196* -0.196*
(0.033) (0.033)
Constant Cut 1 2.480* 2.487*
(0.140) (0.140)
Constant Cut 2 3.472* 3.479*
(0.141) (0.141)
Constant Cut 3 4.870* 4.877
(0.143) (0.143)
var( cons[Country]) 0.129* 0.129
(0.045) (0.045)
Observations 25,520 25,520
Number of groups 17 17
* p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 16: Model Output:Contact Local Official
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2
CCT 0.430* 0.386*
(0.046) (0.066)
Female 0.054 0.038
(0.035) (0.039)
CCTxFemale 0.079
(0.085)
Age 0.057* 0.057*
(0.006) (0.006)
Age2 -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Edu 0.019* 0.019*
(0.005) (0.005)
Wealth -0.046* -0.046*
(0.007) (0.007)
Urban -0.219* -0.219*
(0.043) (0.043)
Constant -2.857* -2.849*
(0.157) (0.157)
var( cons[Country]) 0.059 0.059
(0.157) (0.023)
Observations 25,593 25,593
Number of groups 17 17
*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 17: Contact Municipal Office
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2
CCT 0.462* 0.422*
(0.050) (0.070)
Female 0.049 0.0324
(0.037) (0.041)
CCTxFemale 0.073
(0.091)
Age 0.068* 0.068*
(0.006)
Age2 -0.001* -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000)
Edu 0.032* 0.032*
(0.005) (0.005)
Wealth -0.028* -0.028*
(0.008) (0.008)
Urban -0.219* -0.219*
(0.046) (0.046)
Constant -3.542* -3.534*
(0.170) (0.171)
var( cons[Country]) 0.079 0.079
(0.030) (0.030)
Observations 25,642 25,642
Number of groups 17 17
*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 18: Model Output: Protest
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2
CCT 0.315* 0.371*
(0.071) (0.095)
Female -0.200* -0.179*
(0.051) (0.056)
CCTxFemale -0.114
(0.131)
Age 0.018 0.018
(0.009) (0.009)
Age2 -0.000* -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Edu 0.072* 0.072*
(0.008) (0.008)
Wealth 0.002 0.001
(0.008) (0.011)
Urban 0.121 0.121
(0.069) (0.069)
Constant -3.726* -3.736*
(0.241) (0.241)
var( cons[pais]) 0.211 0.211
(0.079) (0.079)
Observations 25,546 25,546
Number of groups 17 17
*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
Table 19: Model Output: Political Interest
VARIABLES Coef S.E.
CCT 0.240* (0.033)
Female -0.245* (0.023)
Age 0.025* (0.004)
Age2 -0.000* (0.000)
Edu 0.072* (0.003)
Wealth 0.026* (0.005)
Urban -0.136* (0.029)
Constant Cut 1 0.628* (0.117)
Constant Cut 2 2.164* (0.118)
Constant Cut 3 3.760* (0.120)
var( cons[pais]) 0.089 (0.031)
Observations 25,611
Number of groups 17
*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 20: Model Output: Political Efficacy-Government Listens
VARIABLES Coef S.E.
CCT 0.088* (0.035)
Female -0.064* (0.024)
Age -0.003 (0.004)
Age2 0.000* (0.000)
Edu 0.002* (0.004)
Wealth -0.005 (0.005)
Urban -0.083* (0.031)
Crime -0.191* (0.032)
Econ 0.243* (0.018)
Clientelism -0.194* (0.037)
Constant Cut 1 -1.224* (0.123)
Constant Cut 2 -0.601* (0.123)
Constant Cut 3 0.042 (0.123)
Constant Cut 4 0.780* (0.123)
Constant Cut 5 1.712* (0.123)
Constant Cut 6 2.504* (0.125)
var( cons[pais]) 0.092 (0.033)
Observations 21,210
Number of groups 16
* p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 21: Model Output: Political Efficacy-Trust President
VARIABLES Coef S.E.
CCT 0.338* (0.035)
Female 0.006 (0.024)
Age 0.002 (0.004)
Age2 0.000* (0.000)
Edu -0.018* (0.004)
Wealth -0.024* (0.005)
Urban -0.141* (0.030)
Crime -0.272* (0.032)
Econ 0.447* (0.018)
Clientelism -0.294* (0.037)
Constant Cut 1 -1.872* (0.180)
Constant Cut 2 -1.344* (0.180)
Constant Cut 3 -0.740* (0.179)
Constant Cut 4 0.010 (0.179)
Constant Cut 5 0.856* (0.179)
Constant Cut 6 1.655* (0.180)
var( cons[pais]) 0.366 (0.130)
Observations 21,417
Number of groups 16
* p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 22: Model Output: Political Efficacy-Trust National Congress
VARIABLES Coef S.E.
CCT 0.212* (0.035)
Female 0.121* (0.025)
Age -0.037* (0.004)
Age2 0.000* (0.000)
Edu -0.007* (0.004)
Wealth -0.012* (0.005)
Urban -0.268* (0.031)
Crime -0.271* (0.032)
Econ 0.234* (0.018)
Clientelism -0.256* (0.037)
Constant Cut 1 -2.489* (0.154)
Constant Cut 2 -1.815* (0.153)
Constant Cut 3 -1.019* (0.153)
Constant Cut 4 -0.138 (0.153)
Constant Cut 5 0.876* (0.153)
Constant Cut 6 1.809* (0.155)
var( cons[pais]) 0.223 (0.080)
Observations 21,044
Number of groups 16
* p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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Table 23: Model Output: Political Efficacy-Trust Local Government
VARIABLES Coef S.E.
CCT 0.133* (0.034)
Female 0.067* (0.024)
Age -0.022* (0.004)
Age2 0.000* (0.000)
Edu -0.023* (0.004)
Wealth 0.010 (0.005)
Urban -0.163* (0.030)
Crime -0.308* (0.032)
Econ 0.266* (0.018)
Clientelism -0.337* (0.037)
Constant Cut 1 -2.346* (0.138)
Constant Cut 2 -1.739* (0.138)
Constant Cut 3 -1.007* (0.138)
Constant Cut 4 -0.183 (0.137)
Constant Cut 5 0.744* (0.138)
Constant Cut 6 1.613* (0.138)
var( cons[pais]) 0.155 (0.056)
Observations 21,388
Number of groups 16
*p<0.05
Standard errors in parentheses
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APPENDIX C: SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table 24: Respondent CCT Beneficiary Status by Country
Country Non-Beneficiary Beneficiary Total
Argentina 1220 279 1499
Brazil 1117 381 1498
Chile 1471 87 1558
Colombia 1038 439 1477
Costa Rica 1403 124 1527
Dom. Rep. 941 579 1520
Ecuador 1038 439 1477
El Sal. 1389 120 1509
Guatemala 1243 260 1503
Honduras 1226 331 1557
Jamaica 1077 411 1488
Mexico 1168 361 1529
Panama 1283 199 1482
Paraguay 1379 116 1495
Peru 1409 75 1484
Trin. & Tob. 3735 406 4141
Uruguay 1349 161 1510
Total 23486 4783 28269
Table 25: Continuous Variable Summary Statistics
Age Age2 Wealth Edu
Min 16 256 1.00 0.00
Mean 40.75 1920.35 8.86 9.63
Max 99 9801 16 18
StdDev 40.75 1486.96 3.15 4.26
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Table 26: Political Interest and Efficacy Summary Statistics
Frequency Percent
Political Interest
None 8,939 31.59
Little 9,914 35.04
Some 6,732 23.79
A Lot 2,709 9.57
Political Efficacy
0 7,445 26.76
1 3,833 13.78
2 4,268 15.34
3 4,635 16.66
4 3,927 14.12
5 1,884 6.77
6 1,829 6.57
Table 27: Dichotomous Variable Summary Statistics
Frequency Percent
Male 13796 48.46
Female 14672 51.54
Rural 7264 25.52
Urban 21204 74.48
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